Free Will and Determinism: Can Humans Be Morally Responsible Agents?

Zihe Wang

doi:10.54254/2753-7064/2025.ND28262

Communications in Humanities ResearchOpen access

Free Will and Determinism: Can Humans Be Morally Responsible Agents?

Research Article

Open Access

Free Will and Determinism: Can Humans Be Morally Responsible Agents?

Zihe Wang ^1*

¹ The Hill School

^*Corresponding author: cwang26@thehill.org

Published on 23 October 2025

CHR Vol.90

ISSN (Print): 2753-7072

ISSN (Online): 2753-7064

ISBN (Print): 978-1-80590-461-8

ISBN (Online): 978-1-80590-462-5

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Abstract

This paper aims to examine whether agents are to be held morally responsible for their actions in a deterministic world. In order to do so, the paper puts the most demanding species of moral responsibility, accountability, at its center and argues for a compatibilist framework grounded in guidance control. Where actions issue from an owned, adequately reasons-responsive mechanism. Main central concepts are explicitly clarified, such as leeway vs. source-hood interpretations of what is necessary to be free, and introducing different perspectives on the topic at hand. It then evaluates the Compatibilism argument against the Incompatibilism, including notable classical arguments and critiques. Building on Fischer and Ravizza’s model, the paper defends reasons-responsiveness and historical ownership as sufficient for responsibility in the absence of “freewill.” This paper seeks to align theory with intuition, such that the intuitive sense of morality does not diminish and preserve the desert-based evaluation, the integrity of blame, praise, and sanction within a causally ordered world.

Keywords:

free will, determinism, moral responsibility, compatibilism

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