The Puzzle of Informative Identity: A Descriptivist Response
Research Article
Open Access
CC BY

The Puzzle of Informative Identity: A Descriptivist Response

Tianyun Zhang 1*
1 Beijing Huijia Private School
*Corresponding author: 26zhangtianyun@huijia.edu.cn
Published on 23 October 2025
Journal Cover
CHR Vol.90
ISSN (Print): 2753-7072
ISSN (Online): 2753-7064
ISBN (Print): 978-1-80590-461-8
ISBN (Online): 978-1-80590-462-5
Download Cover

Abstract

The puzzle of informative identity has been a widely debated logical issue for a long time. To be more specific, the problem of how people should define the exact referent of identity statements such as “A is B” remains mysterious. When the same object is referred to by different names, this kind of identity statement seems a priori and non-informative. In addition, defining identity statements as connections between “names” would mean that they are relations between symbols. This nature of identity statements makes them an urgent philosophical problem. This paper argues that Bertrand Russell’s descriptivist theory provides a resolution to Gottlob Frege’s puzzle of informative identity statements by fundamentally dissolving its core assumptions, rather than merely offering an alternative argument. This paper reaches this conclusion by justifying Russellian descriptivism’s superiority over Frege’s metaphysical theory, which involves sense and reference. This paper defends descriptivism against Kripke’s objections by altering the modal functors such as “necessarily” and “possibly” in a sentence in natural languages to show that the “scope” of a sentence is controllable.

Keywords:

descriptivism, sense, reference, informative identity, rigid designator

View PDF
Zhang,T. (2025). The Puzzle of Informative Identity: A Descriptivist Response. Communications in Humanities Research,90,19-24.

References

[1]. Frege, G. (1948) Sense and Reference. The Philosophical Review, 57(3), 209-230.

[2]. Kant, I. (1998) Critique of Pure Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[3]. Frege, G. (1967) Begriffsschrift. In J. Van Heijenoort (ed.) From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1-82.

[4]. Russell, B. (1905) On Denoting. Mind, 114(456), 873-887.

[5]. Searle, J. (1958) Russell’s Objection to Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference. Analysis, 18(6), 137-143.

[6]. Blackburn, S. and Code, A. (1978) The Power of Russell’s Criticism of Frege: ‘On Denoting’. Analysis, 38(2), 65-77.

[7]. Kripke S. (1940) Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

[8]. Soames, S. (1998) The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions. Nous, 32(1), 1-22.

[9]. Dummett, M. (1973) Frege, Philosophy of Language. New York: Harper & Row.

Cite this article

Zhang,T. (2025). The Puzzle of Informative Identity: A Descriptivist Response. Communications in Humanities Research,90,19-24.

Data availability

The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study will be available from the authors upon reasonable request.

About volume

Volume title: Proceedings of ICIHCS 2025 Symposium: Voices of Action: Narratives of Faith, Ethics, and Social Practice

ISBN: 978-1-80590-461-8(Print) / 978-1-80590-462-5(Online)
Editor: Enrique Mallen , Kurt Buhring
Conference website: https://2025.icihcs.org/
Conference date: 17 November 2025
Series: Communications in Humanities Research
Volume number: Vol.90
ISSN: 2753-7064(Print) / 2753-7072(Online)