Soybeans at the Center of U.S.–China Trade: A Nash Equilibrium Approach
Research Article
Open Access
CC BY

Soybeans at the Center of U.S.–China Trade: A Nash Equilibrium Approach

Xinyan Lu 1* Jingru Min 2, Yuanzhe Huang 3, Yuchang She 4
1 Nanjing Foreign Language School
2 Guangdong Experimental Middle School
3 Weiming Highschool
4 Shuiguohu High school
*Corresponding author: luxy0806@outlook.com
Published on 26 November 2025
Volume Cover
AEMPS Vol.244
ISSN (Print): 2754-1177
ISSN (Online): 2754-1169
ISBN (Print): 978-1-80590-563-9
ISBN (Online): 978-1-80590-564-6
Download Cover

Abstract

This paper examines the strategic dynamics of soybean trade between the United States and China through a static Nash Equilibrium (NE) framework. Using data from 2008 to 2023 on trade volumes and world soybean prices, we estimate a multivariate regression linking global prices to the import and export behavior of major countries. The estimated elasticities show that China’s imports significantly raise world prices, while U.S. exports exert a strong downward pressure. Based on these relationships, we construct a payoff matrix and identify the equilibrium strategies of both nations. The model predicts that, absent strategic motives, China would import a low volume while the U.S. would export heavily—contradicting observed behavior. To reconcile this gap, we introduce a “strategic benefit” term for China, reflecting food security, forest protection, and long-term supply stability. Incorporating this factor shifts the NE to one consistent with reality: China maintains high imports while the U.S. limits exports. The results highlight that global agricultural trade cannot be explained by price mechanisms alone; strategic and policy considerations play a decisive role. Our findings underscore the importance of integrating security-oriented objectives into economic models of international commodity trade.

Keywords:

Commodity trade, Nash equilibrium, Multivariate regression

View PDF
Lu,X.;Min,J.;Huang,Y.;She,Y. (2025). Soybeans at the Center of U.S.–China Trade: A Nash Equilibrium Approach. Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences,244,1-10.

References

[1]. Benguria, F., Choi, J., Swenson, D. L., & Xu, M. J. (2022). Anxiety or pain? The impact of tariffs and uncertainty on Chinese firms in the trade war. Journal of International Economics, 137, 103608.

[2]. Carter, C. A., & Lohmar, B. (2002). Regional restrictions on agricultural import patterns: The case of China’s soybean imports. Agricultural Economics, 27(3), 321–330.

[3]. Lia, H., Zhang, Y., & Wang, C. (2018). Dependency and volatility in Sino-US soybean trade: A policy-driven analysis. Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 29(4), 456–472.

[4]. De Souza, M., & Garcia, R. (2015). Infrastructure, technology and export expansion: The case of Brazilian soybeans. World Development, 70, 1–14.

[5]. Kim, S., & Lee, J. (2017). Price elasticity and food security: South Korea’s soybean import policy. Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, 14(2), 89–104.

[6]. Marchant, M. A., Koo, W. W., & Hart, C. E. (2004). International trade and competition in soybean markets. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 36(1), 121–134.

[7]. Wang, Y., & Wang, L. (2020). Diversifying import sources: China’s strategy to enhance bargaining power in soybean markets. China Agricultural Economic Review, 12(3), 511–528.

[8]. McCorriston, S., & MacLaren, D. (2007). Cooperation and competition in coffee export quotas: A game theory approach. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 58(2), 225–241.

[9]. Huang, J., & Chen, W. (2015). Export restrictions and pricing power in rare earth markets: A non-cooperative game analysis. Resources Policy, 46, 12–20.

[10]. Ito, S., & Peterson, E. W. (2010). A duopoly model of rice export competition: Thailand and Vietnam. Agricultural Economics, 42(2), 187–196.

[11]. Liu, X., & Yue, C. (2019). Game analysis of Sino-US soybean trade friction: Welfare effects and strategic responses. Journal of Global Economic Analysis, 4(2), 78–95.

[12]. Zhang, R. (2021). Food security and import strategy: A dynamic game analysis of China’s soybean trade.

[13]. Johnson, M., & Brožena, K. (2020). Coordination challenges in a potential South American soybean export alliance: Evidence from Brazil and Argentina. International Economics and Economic Policy, 17(3), 567–585.

References

[1]. Benguria, F., Choi, J., Swenson, D. L., & Xu, M. J. (2022). Anxiety or pain? The impact of tariffs and uncertainty on Chinese firms in the trade war. Journal of International Economics, 137, 103608.

[2]. Carter, C. A., & Lohmar, B. (2002). Regional restrictions on agricultural import patterns: The case of China’s soybean imports. Agricultural Economics, 27(3), 321–330.

[3]. Lia, H., Zhang, Y., & Wang, C. (2018). Dependency and volatility in Sino-US soybean trade: A policy-driven analysis. Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 29(4), 456–472.

[4]. De Souza, M., & Garcia, R. (2015). Infrastructure, technology and export expansion: The case of Brazilian soybeans. World Development, 70, 1–14.

[5]. Kim, S., & Lee, J. (2017). Price elasticity and food security: South Korea’s soybean import policy. Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, 14(2), 89–104.

[6]. Marchant, M. A., Koo, W. W., & Hart, C. E. (2004). International trade and competition in soybean markets. Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 36(1), 121–134.

[7]. Wang, Y., & Wang, L. (2020). Diversifying import sources: China’s strategy to enhance bargaining power in soybean markets. China Agricultural Economic Review, 12(3), 511–528.

[8]. McCorriston, S., & MacLaren, D. (2007). Cooperation and competition in coffee export quotas: A game theory approach. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 58(2), 225–241.

[9]. Huang, J., & Chen, W. (2015). Export restrictions and pricing power in rare earth markets: A non-cooperative game analysis. Resources Policy, 46, 12–20.

[10]. Ito, S., & Peterson, E. W. (2010). A duopoly model of rice export competition: Thailand and Vietnam. Agricultural Economics, 42(2), 187–196.

[11]. Liu, X., & Yue, C. (2019). Game analysis of Sino-US soybean trade friction: Welfare effects and strategic responses. Journal of Global Economic Analysis, 4(2), 78–95.

[12]. Zhang, R. (2021). Food security and import strategy: A dynamic game analysis of China’s soybean trade.

[13]. Johnson, M., & Brožena, K. (2020). Coordination challenges in a potential South American soybean export alliance: Evidence from Brazil and Argentina. International Economics and Economic Policy, 17(3), 567–585.

Cite this article

Lu,X.;Min,J.;Huang,Y.;She,Y. (2025). Soybeans at the Center of U.S.–China Trade: A Nash Equilibrium Approach. Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences,244,1-10.

Data availability

The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study will be available from the authors upon reasonable request.

About volume

Volume title: Proceedings of ICFTBA 2025 Symposium: Strategic Human Capital Management in the Era of AI

ISBN: 978-1-80590-563-9(Print) / 978-1-80590-564-6(Online)
Editor: Lukáš Vartiak, Anil Nguyen
Conference website: https://www.icftba.org/London.html
Conference date: 4 November 2025
Series: Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences
Volume number: Vol.244
ISSN: 2754-1169(Print) / 2754-1177(Online)

© 2024 by the author(s). Licensee EWA Publishing, Oxford, UK. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license. Authors who publish this series agree to the following terms:

1. Authors retain copyright and grant the series right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgment of the work's authorship and initial publication in this series.

2. Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the series's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgment of its initial publication in this series.

3. Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See Open access policy for details).

For authors
For editors
For reviewers

Cookies are used by this site.
Copyright © 2024 EWA Publishing, its licensors, and contributors. All rights reserved, including text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.