CEO Power and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from Chinese Industries
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CEO Power and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from Chinese Industries

Jiahua Li 1, Shuyu Teng 2, Mengtian Xu 3, Jingyi Yan 4*
1 South China Agricultural University
2 Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University
3 University of Nottingham Ningbo China
4 Capital Normal University
*Corresponding author: 2499873612@qq.com
Published on 19 November 2025
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AEMPS Vol.241
ISSN (Print): 2754-1177
ISSN (Online): 2754-1169
ISBN (Print): 978-1-80590-541-7
ISBN (Online): 978-1-80590-542-4
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Abstract

Whether CEO power concentration exacerbates or mitigates stock price crash risk is a critical concern in corporate governance and financial market stability. Using a sample from Chinese A-share listed companies (2018–2022), this study employs a quasi-experimental design by estimating a multi-dimensional fixed effects linear model to empirically examine the impact of CEO power on future crash risk, with a focus on the moderating role of the single-control structure ("One Control One"). The results reveal that: (1) Greater CEO power significantly increases stock price crash risk; (2) Significant industry heterogeneity exists, indicating that industry characteristics moderate this relationship, pointing towards implications for targeted regulation; (3) The "One Control One" governance structure amplifies CEO power’s detrimental impact by weakening internal monitoring mechanisms. These findings indicate that powerful CEOs act as significant contributors to heightened crash risk in China’s emerging market, particularly under concentrated control structures. This research provides critical insights for policymakers and corporations to design industry-specific governance frameworks that balance CEO authority with effective oversight.

Keywords:

CEO power, stock price crash risk, One Control One, corporate governance

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Li,J.;Teng,S.;Xu,M.;Yan,J. (2025). CEO Power and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from Chinese Industries. Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences,241,40-58.

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Cite this article

Li,J.;Teng,S.;Xu,M.;Yan,J. (2025). CEO Power and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from Chinese Industries. Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences,241,40-58.

Data availability

The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study will be available from the authors upon reasonable request.

About volume

Volume title: Proceedings of ICFTBA 2025 Symposium: Global Trends in Green Financial Innovation and Technology

ISBN: 978-1-80590-541-7(Print) / 978-1-80590-542-4(Online)
Editor: Lukáš Vartiak, Sun Huaping
Conference date: 20 November 2025
Series: Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences
Volume number: Vol.241
ISSN: 2754-1169(Print) / 2754-1177(Online)