Strategic Executive Compensation in Alphabet: Governance and Long-Term Alignment

Hong Jin

doi:10.54254/2754-1169/2025.LH25604

Advances in Economics, Management and Political SciencesOpen access

Strategic Executive Compensation in Alphabet: Governance and Long-Term Alignment

Research Article

Open Access

Strategic Executive Compensation in Alphabet: Governance and Long-Term Alignment

Hong Jin ^1*

¹ Jinan University

^*Corresponding author: 2022101629@stu2022.jnu.edu.cn

Published on 30 July 2025

AEMPS Vol.207

ISSN (Print): 2754-1177

ISSN (Online): 2754-1169

ISBN (Print): 978-1-80590-299-7

ISBN (Online): 978-1-80590-300-0

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Abstract

This study provides an in-depth analysis of Alphabet's executive compensation policies for the fiscal years 2020 to 2024. Through the systematic content analysis of public documents such as shareholder proxy letters, it is revealed that its compensation structure is centered on basic salary, annual bonus and the dominant long-term equity incentive. Research has found that Alphabet's compensation strategy aims to attract, retain and motivate top talents through market-leading compensation levels, while striving to closely align the interests of executives with the company's long-term strategy, shareholder value creation and corporate governance requirements through a sophisticated performance-linked mechanism. And it shows an evolving trend of strengthening performance orientation, paying attention to ESG factors and responding to market dynamics. This study provides a key reference for understanding how global tech giants balance incentives, risks and long-term value, and deal with complex governance environments. The findings offer valuable implications for executive incentive design in other innovation-driven enterprises navigating dynamic market conditions and increasing stakeholder scrutiny.

Keywords:

Executive compensation, Alphabet, corporate governance, incentive alignment.

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